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A LABOR MARKET WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISITCS 
 
Richard B. Freeman 
 
 
ABSTRACT:  
Prior to its economic reforms, China did not have an operating labor market. The government 
assigned workers to firms rather than allowing them to choose their own place of work and used hukou 
residency policies to keep rural people from migrating to cities. Firms hired workers that government 
labor bureaus assigned to them regardless of economic need and paid the workers according to a 
national wage grid from a payroll budget set by the government.  As China reformed its urban economy 
from the 1980s through the 2000s, the government relaxed its control of workers and firms and gave 
greater leeway to supply and demand to set employment, wages, and working conditions.   This essay 
tells how China moved from state determination of labor outcomes to a genuine labor market and how 
the new labor market with Chinese characteristics has operated. It examines three big labor problems 
that face China on its path of continued economic growth: labor-management conflict; absorbing 
millions of university graduates into fruitful jobs; and bringing rural persons and informal sector 
workers fully into the modern economy.  
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Prior to its economic reforms, China did not have an operating labor market. The government 
assigned workers to firms rather than allowing them to choose their own place of work and used hukou 
residency policies to keep rural people from migrating to cities. Firms hired the workers assigned by 
the labor bureaus regardless of economic need and paid them according to a national wage grid from a 
payroll budget set by the government. 
 
Bureaucratic allocation of labor and determination of pay may work well in a single firm or 
government agency but is inconsistent with a market economy where hundreds of millions of workers 
and consumers and millions of firms interact in multiple economic transactions.  As China reformed its 
urban economy from the 1980s through the 2000s, the government relaxed its control of workers and 
firms. It gave greater leeway to supply and demand to set employment, wages, and working conditions, 
producing the labor market with Chinese characteristics of the chapter’s title.  
 
This essay tells how China moved from state determination of labor outcomes to a genuine labor 
market and how the new labor market has operated. It then examines three big labor problems that face 
China on its path of continued economic growth: labor-management conflict; absorbing millions of 
university graduates into fruitful jobs; and bringing rural persons and informal sector workers fully into 
the modern economy.  
 
STARTING POINT: STATE DETERMINATION OF LABOR OUTCOMES?  
 
Before its economic reforms, China relied on administrative ruling to set employment, wages, and 
conditions of work. State owned enterprises (SOEs) were the predominant business organization. 
Government labor bureaus decided how many workers the SOEs hired. Managers did not have the 
authority to lay off workers nor to alter wages in ways they thought would benefit the firm. Workers 
could not move from their assigned firm without government approval. Viewing workers as cadres 
whose function was to follow orders (much as an army views conscripts), government labor bureaus 
assigned workers to jobs to further the government's Five Year Plan.1    
 
In this administered labor system, firms set wages according to a government wage grid. The grid 
had 8 grades for blue-collar workers and 24 grades for white-collar workers, including professional, 
technical, and managerial employees. To keep inequality low, the grid allowed for only small 
differences across enterprises, industries, and regions. Seniority dominated the wage distribution within 
industrial enterprises. Along with pay, state owned enterprises were responsible for housing, 
retirement, and medical care of employees.  
 
Work units known as danwei were the critical institution controlling urban labor. The government 
assigned every worker to a danwei, which regulated aspects of their lives from travel to marriage to 
provision of food in centralized canteens to access to entertainment. The Communist party kept 
dossiers on the activities of workers (dangan)2 and penalized workers who broke administrative rules 
with loss of pay or allocation to less desirable housing or work assignments.3 For their part, workers 
relied on personal connections (guanxi) with decision-makers to influence the government decisions 
that affected their lives. Perhaps your uncle working for the city could help you get a job in a 
workplace near your home rather than in Mongolia. Perhaps your family could do a favor for the party 
official who determined work assignments, who would reciprocate by assigning you the type of work 
you wanted. Personal connections substituted for market freedom in matching workers with jobs.4  
 
Workers who sought to change their job relied on guanxi help from family connections, former 
classmates, or relatives. Persons with party membership or other official status did best in moving to 
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more desirable jobs but most workers remained with the firm to which the state had initially assigned 
them. In a 1999 survey 78 percent of urban workers reported that they had only a single employer in 
their work life.5  As reforms proceeded the government recognized the legitimacy of individuals 
applying for jobs on their own and of employers screening applicants and choosing their hires but 
reforming the assignment system came late in the process of modernizing the economy.6  
  
Exemplifying the way the job assignment process worked, in the 1970s when urban areas faced 
potential high levels of youth unemployment, the government ordered state owned enterprises to 
promise older workers who retired early that the firm would give their job to their son or daughter. In 
1979 about 90 per cent of the 8,000 new workers for Chongqing Iron and Steel Company were the 
children of employees, and of those over 3,000 directly replaced retiringretiring parents7. Some SOEs 
formed new collective factories or other companies to create jobs for their employees' children. The 
goal was to assure that urban China had full employment.  
  
To control the rural work force the government used the hukou household registration system. This 
system required citizens to register their permanent place of residence with the government. Persons 
with urban hukou were entitled to jobs in state-owned enterprises and to education, housing, and health 
care. From the mid-1950s through the 1970s urban residents received ration cards for buying grain and 
other necessities.  Individuals who had rural hukou but who were residing in urban areas received none 
of these benefits. 
 
The government prohibited urban units from recruiting rural workers and required rural persons to 
obtain a temporary certificate to visit an urban area for more than three days.8 Without the urban hukou 
unauthorized rural migrants would have problems finding a place to sleep and buying food in a city. 
The few rural workers who gained urban hukou did so by joining the People’s Army or the Communist 
Party or getting a university degree and shifting their hukou to the university. 
 
Assigning workers to a danwei and keeping rural persons from migrating to urban areas gave the 
government control over the allocation of labor. Setting industry wages and agriculture prices low 
enabled the government to accumulate capital to invest in its goal of capital-intensive industrialization. 
The administered labor system produced an “iron rice bowl” of lifetime job security, income and 
benefits for urban workers. 9 It prevented the massive rural-to-urban migration found in most 
developing countries. But the system failed to match workers and jobs efficiently or to motivate 
workers to give full effort at the workplace. It created an apartheid-like society that made second class 
citizens of the 80 percent or so of the Chinese population in rural areas.  
 
The column “Before Reforms” of exhibit 1 summarizes the labor system in this period of time.  
 
REFORMS TOWARD LABOR MARKET 
  
China started its economic reforms in the late 1970s in agriculture. The government contracted land 
to individual farmers and allowed the farmers to sell their produce on open markets once they had met 
the quota the government set to provide food for urban workers. This household responsibility system 
induced farmers to raise agricultural productivity. The increase in productivity freed many agricultural 
workers to seek work off the farm in the rural area where they had their hukou residency. The 
government increased prices for rural goods as well, which together with higher productivity, raised 
rural incomes relative to urban incomes. Local governments responded to the increased supply of rural 
labor and greater demand for goods and services from farmers by forming or encouraging individuals 
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to form town and village enterprises (TVEs) to produce non-agricultural goods and services in rural 
China.  
 
China's leaders turned next to reforming the industrial sector. Following the path they had begun by 
freeing farmers to profit from exceeding agricultural quotas,  the government allowed state-owned 
enterprises to keep the revenues from production that exceeded the levels dictated by the Five Year 
plans. The government gave state-owned enterprises leeway to determine employment and pay though 
it maintained control over their total payroll.10 Seeking to increase effort and productivity, SOE 
managers introduced piecework-type wages, point systems for bonuses, and linked hiring and 
promotion to performance and skills.11 The government also allowed management to fire employees 
who did not perform adequately and to select employees by examinations that tested them for technical 
skill and work performance.  
 
In the 1990s the Ministry of Labor began to relieve enterprises from providing housing, medical 
service, and pension benefits to their employees. The goal was to develop portable national pension, 
health, and unemployment insurance programs comparable to social security systems in most other 
countries. To protect older workers in the transition, the state differentiated workers who retired or who 
started work before 1997 and were still working then and those who started after 1997. The older 
cohorts receive a housing subsidy when their firm did not provide them apartments while newer 
cohorts did not receive a subsidy. The government described this policy as “New People new rule, old 
people old rule”.  
 
Another step in non-agricultural reforms was to allow non-state owned enterprises – town and 
village enterprises in rural areas; private firms; foreign-owned multinationals – to enter or expand in 
the market. The percentage of workers in TVEs increased from 9 percent in 1980 to 26 percent in 1995 
and the TVEs became more privately controlled.12 In the urban sector, employment in state-owned 
enterprises (run by the central government) or in urban collective enterprises (run by cities or other 
lower jurisdictions) dropped from about 90 percent of urban workers in the 1970s to 50 percent in the 
1990s and kept falling through the 2000s. By 2010 just 30 percent of urban workers worked in state-
owned or collective enterprises; about 60 percent were self-employed or worked in privately owned 
firms, including 10 percent in foreign owned and Hong Kong, Macao, or Taiwanese firms; while the 
rest were in cooperatives, or joint or limited liability firms over which government had some control.13 
 
Freeing SOE management to operate by market principles and allowing private enterprise to 
employ a majority of the work force was the death knell to the system of labor bureaus assigning 
workers to jobs. Young workers increasingly found jobs on their own. By 2001 the state assigned only 
5 percent of college graduates to jobs and shortly thereafter it ended the job assignment system.  
 
China's economic reforms set off one of the greatest economic expansions in history. Firms 
desperately sought workers to produce goods for export and for building infrastructure and domestic 
consumption. With rural people able to rent housing   and buy food, and other consumption items on 
the open market and to set up their own businesses in the informal sector, some 150-160 million rural 
persons migrated to work in cities between 1980 and 2010.14 Benefiting from this “floating population” 
of migrants, cities encouraged rural residents to migrate to work but cities  but at the same time 
withheld from migrants the benefits of urban amenities such as health care and the right to enroll their 
children into regular urban schools, the right to buy rather than to rent housing. As an example of the 
discrimination against migrants, pregnant women were told to go back to hospitals in their rural area to 
bear children rather than use the urban medical facilities. Cities sold urban hukou at prices that varied 
depending on the size and attractiveness of the city.15  
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At the turn of the millennium parts of the administered labor system remained but market forces 
had replaced administrative orders as the driving force for employment, wages, and working conditions 
in China. How did the new labor market change wage and employment outcomes from those set by the 
government administrative rule? 
 
THE NEW LABOR MARKET: WAGES AND INCOME  
 
Market determination of pay increased wage and income differentials along a variety of dimensions 
(see exhibit 2). Urban incomes increased more rapidly than rural incomes, which produced the highest 
urban-rural income gap on record: urban incomes 3.13 times rural incomes in 2011 (exhibit 2, column 
1). The earnings premium of junior college or bachelors' graduates over  high school graduates of the 
same age increased from the 1990s through 2009. (column 2). The earnings advantages of workers in 
the highest paying  industries relative to workers in the lowest paying  industries  increased 
substantially over the period (column 3 ). Incomes in the more industrialized and high income coastal 
regions pulled further ahead of incomes in the lower income provinces in the interior of the country and 
in the north and west.  Although  geographic disparity in earnings declined in the 2000s, regional 
disparities were far higher in 2011 than in the 1980s and 1990s (column 4).  The last column in exhibit 
2 compares the incomes of college graduates aged 25 to the incomes of migrant workers. It shows an 
increase in the ratio of young college workers to migrant workers in the 1990s, followed by a drop in 
the 2000s as migrant incomes increased greatly.  This generated claims that China had entered a new 
phase of labor market development (the Lewis turning point) that I discuss shortly. 
 
Why did market forces raise earnings differentials so greatly?  
 
One reason is that when the government controlled the economy it set wage differentials far below 
market-clearing levels. It did not have to pay people more to acquire skills or move to particular 
sectors. It assigned people to those activities. Once workers could move among jobs and firms could 
alter pay to attract the workers they wanted, supply and demand raised pay more in higher skilled and 
paid activities than in lower skilled and paid activities.  
 
A second reason is that as the economy grew supply and demand changed in favor of more skilled 
and higher paid work activities. Growth of GDP, for example, shifted demand for labor to higher skill 
occupations and industries, which raised the earnings of college graduates.16  
 
The increase in wage differentials raised inequality in earnings. Exhibit 3 displays two measures of 
inequality in labor earnings: the variance of the log earnings of workers and the ratio of the earnings of 
workers at the 75th percentile of the earnings distribution to the earnings of workers at the 25th 
percentile. Both statistics show a trend increase in inequality with a modest dip in 2009, possibly 
because of the global economic recession.  
 
Exhibit 4 turns FTO inequality in total income, as measured by Gini coefficients for total income. 
Inequality of total income depends on the distribution of national income between labor and capital, 
which shifted toward capital in China as in most other countries, and on the level of inequality in 
capital income, which far exceeds inequality in labor income in all countries, as well as on the 
inequality in labor income. Chinese officials pay close attention to the Gini coefficient in the belief that 
values above 0.40-0.45 foment social unrest. The estimated Gini coefficient of 0.47 in 2012 was in the 
danger range but estimates from other sources suggest that the Gini could be much higher.17 Statistical 
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measures aside, opinion polls show that China's citizens view inequality as a huge problem, and place it 
and corruption at the top of their list of concerns.18  
 
TURNOVER, MOBILITY AND PRODUCTIVITY  
 
China's economic reforms opened the door for firms to hire and fire workers freely and for workers 
to change jobs as they saw fit. Lifetime security for workers disappeared.  Working in a single firm for 
an entire working life disappeared.  State owned enterprises laid workers off when they deemed it 
necessary and hired temporary workers when they deemed it profitable. Urban workers, particularly 
young educated persons, changed jobs frequently in pursuit of higher paying and better work. Rural 
workers poured into cities, moving from employer to employer.  
 
The most striking shift in employer behavior occurred in the late 1990s when state-owned 
enterprises and urban collectives undertook the biggest layoff of workers in history. Seeing these 
enterprises as an inefficient drag on the economy and burdens on governmental budgets, the central 
government announced the goal of restructuring, privatizing, or closing thousands of state-owned 
industries and reducing employment in the state-owned sector by 30 percent. Under the slogan “Grasp 
the Large, Release the Small” the government closed many large firms and privatized smaller firms. 
From 1995 to 2000, employment in state owned enterprises fell by 36 million persons while 
employment in urban collective enterprises fell by 21 million persons. Many workers who lost their 
jobs had little skills beyond those used at their workplace. None had experience searching for work in 
the labor market.19 The result was that the official rate of joblessness, which had been near zero in the 
pre-reform period, reached 4.3 percent in 2002. But this underestimated the extent of job loss because 
many enterprises kept workers on the books as xiagang – off-post – workers, paying them modest 
benefits without work.20 Counting these persons as unemployed, the rate of joblessness exceeded 10 
percent or so.  
 
The late 1990s retrenchment of the state-owned and collective enterprise sector 21was China's 
version of the “big bang” shift from a planned economy to a market economy that the former Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe undertook following the fall of communism.  In contrast to the 10-15 
percent declines in GDP associated with the transition to markets in most European transition 
economies, however, GDP continued to grow during big bang retrenchment of the state sector. But 
growth did not benefit many of the laid-off once-privileged SOE and urban collective workers.  The 
government provided some unemployment compensation and training programs to the displaced 
workers but nothing that could ameliorate the loss of the iron rice bowl. The biggest beneficiaries of 
privatizing state owned businesses were factory managers or relatives or friends of party officials with 
guanxi who bought the profitable parts of firms at bargain prices and left the unprofitable parts and  
commitments to  pension and medical costs of workers in government hands. In some provinces, such 
as Liaoning in the North, tens of thousands of xiagang workers protested the loss of jobs and corrupt 
privatization – the first massive protest against the communist state in modern times, but to no avail.  
 
Continued economic growth shifted the locus of turnover from firms to workers. With firms no 
longer providing social benefits workers were less tied to their employer than in the past. Young urban 
workers moved from firm to firm in search of better job matches and higher pay. Turnover rates in 
major firms rose to 20 percent or so per year22 – a proportion of voluntary leaving similar to the yearly 
quit rate for American workers,23 and far above turnover in many other advanced countries. The huge 
flow of migrants added millions more persons who shifted jobs frequently, some working self-
employed in the informal sector and some working on short term stints at construction sites and for 
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firms. A substantial proportion of migrants would return to their village at the Spring Holiday and then 
find other work instead of going back to the same employer.  
 
When the economic reforms kicked in China had relatively few college graduates. Mao's Cultural 
Revolution had wrecked China's higher education system so that less than 100,000 students were 
enrolled university in 1970.24 From 1978 through 1988 China averaged less than 300,000 graduates per 
year. It expanded enrollments moderately in the 1980s and 1990s; added hundreds of new institutions 
of higher education in the 2000s, and produced a massive increase in enrollments and graduates in the 
2000s.25 The number of bachelor's graduates increased to 600,000 in 1990, doubled to 1.2 million in 
2002 and then jumped by over fivefold to 7 million in 2013. In three decades China had transformed a 
train-wreck higher education system into a system that educated the “best and brightest” top scorers on 
the national entrance and then into a system of mass higher education.  
 
Businesses in all countries complain about the costs of voluntary labor turnover and seek ways to 
reduce it. When workers quit their jobs, it is costly to find and train new workers to replace them. For 
some period of time, the productivity of new employees is often lower than that of the experienced 
worker who left. Thus, high turnover is associated with higher costs of production and lower profits for 
an individual firm. But from the standpoint of the economy writ large, turnover often improves 
economic performance. Workers who move to higher paying more productive jobs not only raise their 
own incomes but increase national output. As China reformed its economy workers moved from lower-
paying rural jobs to higher paying jobs in rural town and village enterprises.  Then  they moved to the 
coastal province factories that produced the goods for China's export boom and to construction and 
service sector jobs in larger cities. Within manufacturing, employment shifted from light export 
industries to high value added high tech industries. It is difficult to imagine that China could have 
increased productivity as rapidly and reallocated workers among sectors as successfully as it did 
without a market driven labor system with high labor turnover.  
 
THE “LEWIS TURNING POINT” DEBATE AND INFORMAL URBAN SECTOR  
 
In the 1950s Arthur Lewis developed a model of economic development that captures some of the 
problems faced by China half a century later. Lewis divided developing economies into two sectors: a 
low productivity agricultural sector with an “unlimited” supply of labor and a high productivity modern 
industrial sector that expands by drawing labor from agriculture. With an unlimited (infinitelyelastic) 
supply of labor from agriculture, urban firms are able to increase employment without raising wages. 
This allows them to earn considerable profits which they can then invest profits in expanding their 
business or other businesses to produce a self-sustaining drive to modernization.  As more and more 
rural workers obtain jobs in the urban economy, the supply of labor changes from infinitely elastic to 
an upward sloping curve. This is the “Lewis turning point", where development has advanced 
sufficiently that firms must raise wages to attract more low skill workers. 
 
Lewis based his model on the experience of Caribbean economies but the model offers insights into 
any economy where migration from a lower productivity sector to higher productivity sector is an 
important component of development. In the 2000s migrant wages began rising in China's cities, 
suggesting to some economists that China had reached the Lewis turning point. Other economists 
disagreed, arguing that rural China still harbored millions of “surplus workers” who would move to 
cities without wage increases. Differences in the ratio of urban to rural incomes in various data sources 
and disagreement over the key indicators that identified the turning point fueled the debate.26 Over the 
same period, urban China experienced a huge increase in the proportion of persons in informal 
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employment, by which I mean working ed self-employed, for family-owned or small enterprises that 
faced no pressure to follow the labor laws, or by working without formal status in large firms.  
 
 The informalization of the work force added a new twist to the relation between economic 
growth and employment. In advanced economies most workers work for formal sector firms that offer 
permanent jobs, standard hours, and social security benefits as set by employment laws, collective 
bargaining, and firm-based human resource policies. In developing countries, by contrast, most work in 
jobs that are temporary, irregular, and without legal benefits or protection. With the exception of self-
employed persons who run successful businesses, most informal sector workers earn less and work 
under worse conditions than workers in the formal sector. Until the 1990s and 2000s the prevailing 
view among development experts was that economic growth would shrink the informal sector in the 
same way that it shrinks the agriculture sector in the Lewis model. Some warned governments against 
improving protections and benefits for formal sector urban workers for fear that the increased labor 
costs would slow movement of jobs from the informal to the formal sector.  
 
 But regardless of labor policies, economic growth in the 1990s and 2000s did not reduce the 
informal sector share of employment.  The OECD's analysis of the data led it conclude that the 
informal had become normal.27 rather than a short run transitional state on the growth road. 
Productivity increases in manufacturing and the introduction of new capital-intensive technologies in 
the modern sector of developing economies kept formal sector jobs from increasing rapidly as they had 
done in advanced countries decades earlier. The informal or irregular share of urban employment in 
Korea, arguably the most successful of all developing countries, expanded as the country grew.  In 
China, which rapidly  became the manufacturing center of the world economy, the share of workers in 
manufacturing fell from 16% in 1990 to 13% in 2009 due in large part to the 1990s retrenchment of 
state-owned manufacturing enterprises.  The urban share of manufacturing employment fell even more, 
as firms increasingly outsourced production to lower cost rural areas. 
 
While China's statistical agencies do not provide official estimates of informal sector work, 
analyses of employment data  tell a clear story about the expansion of the informal sector to over half 
of the urban work force in the 2000s.28 Rural migrants constitute a large proportion of the sector, 
working long hours for low pay. In the 1990s rural migrants in the informal sector worked 72 hours per 
week compared to 42 hours per week of persons with an urban hukou in formal sector jobs; earned 30 
percent lower monthly income; 2 percent of the informal sector workers had pension coverage 
compared to 82 percent of the workers with an urban hukou.29 Many large export firms in export and 
construction employed migrant workers without giving migrants the individual employment contracts  
and the social insurances that national labor law required. Lacking legal documentation of their work 
status that they could take to labor arbitration committees responsible for dealing with the rights of 
workers, workers increasingly undertook protests against the way management treated them, ranging 
from wildcat strikes to civil disobedience – blocking roads, surrounding work sites in large numbers, 
etc – that the government viewed as threatening social stability (Lee, 2007).  
 
To strengthen the ability of workers to defend their rights through legal channels, in 2007 the 
Chinese government enacted a new Labor Contract Law. This law required that employers give 
workers written contracts and that employees who accumulate tenure on their job obtain permanent 
rather than temporary contracts. The law was enacted after a remarkable wide-ranging open debate. 
Pro-worker rights forces in China, led by the government-run All China Federation of Trade Unions 
(ACFTU), favored the new initiative. Labor and human rights groups in the US and other advanced 
countries endorsed it. Business groups in China and the US opposed the law on the grounds that it 
would bring back the iron rice bowl and reduce employment by raising labor costs.  
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Despite China's generally weak implementation of labor laws, the new law improved conditions for 
migrant workers. After the law took effect in January 2008, there was a jump in the proportion of 
migrants who obtained individual contracts and in the proportion who received legally mandated social 
insurances and a drop in the proportion whose wage payments were delayed or reduced by the 
employer.30 Because the great recession-induced decline in export demand hit China shortly after the 
law was implemented, it is not possible to determine whether the law adversely affected employment as 
its opponents feared. Employer and employee responses to the recession and recovery dominated 
employment in the late 2000s.  
 
THE GREAT RECESSION TEST  
 
The 2007-2008 global economic decline tested the resilience of labor markets around the world. 
When Chinese exports to advanced countries dropped sharply in winter 2008-2009, many worried how 
the country's new labor market would respond. The immediate impact was a huge decline in jobs.31 
World Bank researchers estimate that between October 2008 and April 2009 49 million rural migrants 
lost their off-the-farm jobs – 6.8 percent of the rural work force -- and that the wages of migrant 
workers fell by 10.5 percent.32 Some advanced countries, such as the US, also experienced large job 
losses while others, such as Germany, introduced various forms of work-sharing to preserve 
employment.  
 
Many labor analysts, who had heralded the US as the advanced world's great jobs machine for its 
performance in the 1990s, expected the US to follow its great job loss with a robust job recovery. It did 
not.  To the contrary, the US had an extraordinarily weak job recovery, with fewer persons employed 
four years after the recession officially ended than helo jobs before the recession. Many other advanced 
countries also had weak recoveries. Unemployment in advanced European countries was in double 
digits in 2013, with Germany being the exception with a rate of unemployment lower after the 
recession than before.  
 
The new labor market with Chinese characteristics did remarkably well in recovering the huge 
recession-related losses. Chinese workers found jobs rapidly. Nearly half of the displaced workers were 
re-employed by April 2009. One year after the crisis most workers had obtained new work.  Some 
found employment in the informal sector. Some returned to their family's land but returned to off-farm 
work as China's aggressive stimulus package33 spurred employment in the non-traded goods parts of 
the economy. The fall in wages may have also induced some firms to increase employment quickly. 
The difference between China's recovery of jobs after it lost millions of jobs in the 2008-2009 Global 
Reecession and its sluggish job creation after the late 1990s layoffs is in part a story of workers and 
firms learning how to navigate a market driven economy.  With some amazement, the World Bank 
team that studied the employment patterns in the Recession in China remarked on “the speed of the 
labor force adjustment in the crisis”34 in China compared to sluggish adjustments in the US and Europe.  
 
LABOR CHALLENGES  
 
The creation of a functioning labor market notwithstanding, China faces major labor problems to 
continue to bring the benefits of modern economic development to its nearly 1.4 billion people. The 
most important challenges are (1) to develop an effective labor relations system to resolve the labor and 
management conflicts that invariably arise in a market economy; (2) to absorb the huge supply of 
university graduates and; (3) to extend social benefits and opportunity to rural citizens and informal 
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sector workers. Resolving these problems will ameliorate the inequalities that accompanied its growth 
spurt and that potentially threaten future social stability.  
 
Historically, trade unions have been the key institution through which workers defend their 
economic interests and collective bargaining has been the mechanism by which unions and 
management resolve workplace disagreements over pay, benefits, and working conditions. On paper 
China has the largest trade union movement in the world. In 2010, the government sponsored All China 
Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) claimed membership of 239 million workers, including 89 
million migrants.35 Unlike independent unions formed by workers, however, the ACFTU has 
traditionally sought to defuse worker discontent and encourage “harmonious labor relations” rather 
than fighting for workers.36 Per the worker in the New York Times interview summarized below, many 
workers saw the union as an extension of authority over them rather than their voice in the economy,:  
 (Worker) “Trade union? ... “What’s that?”  
 (Reporter) Was there no state-sponsored union in their factories, as required in principle? 
 (Worker) “Oh, yeah, I guess maybe we do have one of those ... when management has some 
 new demand or request, they call us together for a  meeting”.37  
 
The shift to a labor market dominated by private employers fundamentally changed the nature of 
China's labor-relations. Workers could protest conditions at work and seek redress from their 
employers without challenging government authority. The number of labor disputes brought to the 
Labor Dispute Arbitration Committees (the legal entity set up to resolve disputes) sky-rocketed from 
8,150 in 1992 to 135,206 in 2000 to 1,280,000 or so in 2010.38  Acting on their own with no help from 
the official unions, workers began striking in large numbers for better conditions in different parts of 
the country.39 In summer 2010 a strike by Honda workers in Guangdong made headlines around the 
world when it produced a collective agreement with improved pay and benefits.40  
 
China's labor laws require firms to accept unions and give the ACFTU exclusive right to represent 
workers, which explains its huge membership. The usual ACFTU mode of organizing a union has been 
to remind management of its legal responsibilities and to ask it to set up a union and appoint a company 
official to be union head, with the promise that “unlike western unions, which always stand against the 
employer, Chinese unions are obliged to boost the corporation's development and maintain sound 
labour relations".41 Even operating in this fashion, AFCTU unions are associated with higher wages 
and greater worker benefits in China,42 perhaps because the firms that agreed to set up a union viewed 
this as part of a positive labor relations policy to prevent worker activism.  
 
Putting the interests of the employer or government above those of workers did not fit the reality of 
China's new labor market. Both the government and the ACFTU sought ways for the official unions to 
operate differently and represent workers in ways that would help China develop a new effective labor 
relations system. In some parts of the country, such as Shenzhen or Guangzhou, the ACFTU has 
broken new ground by establishing procedures for workers to elect union leaders. The head of the 
Guangdong ACFTU committed his organization to put workers interests first in all of its activities. But 
is is unclear how far the ACFTU can reform itself. Local and provincial party organizations appoint 
union leaders, and they often favor business development above all else. Still in 2011, after reviewing 
the changing labor scene on the Mainland, Han Dongfang, the Hong Kong based advocate of 
independent unionism, called on the international union movement to engage the ACFTU to help it 
morph into a genuine representative of workers43  
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The explosive increase in the supply of college graduates from the 1990s through the 2010s poses a 
different challenge to China's labor market. The following headlines (obtained by googling the words, 
“China University graduate employment” in July 2013) give the magnitude of the challenge:  
 College Grads Are Jobless in China's "High-Growth" Economy (Forbes, May 26, 2013); China's 
Graduates Face Glut (Wall Street Journal, August 22, 2011): “Dearth of Work for China's College 
Grads (Businessweek September 01, 2010.) China's Ant Tribe: millions of unemployed college grads, 
(Christian Science Monitor December 21, 2009).  
 
Two facts lie behind the headlines. The first is that many graduates from the huge bachelor's degree 
classes in the late 1990s-early 2010s failed to obtain regular jobs upon graduation, with some 
remaining without work months or even one to two years later.44 A national survey found that 16.4 
percent of college graduates persons aged 21 to 25 years were unemployed in 2011 compared to 8.2 
percent of similarly aged high school graduates,45 while by contrast older college graduates had much 
lower unemployment rates than older less educated workers.  
 
Unemployment is not the only way in which a job market responses to huge increases in supply.  In 
a well-functioning market a supply shock reduces the college earnings premium for new graduates 
relative to less educated workers. This occurred in China to such an extent that the pay of starting 
graduates dropped relative to that of migrant workers, so that it was barely above migrants pay.46 The 
critical issue for the labor market is to whether the higher unemployment and lower pay at the outset of 
their work lives will permanently lower the lifetime income trajectory of graduates,as it has in the US,47 
or whether it will be a temporary blip from which graduates will catch-up as they gain experience.   
 
The labor market has additional ways to adjust to the huge increase in graduate supply that should 
ameliorate the headline-making problems. On the demand side, with more graduates available at lower 
wages, industries that rely most extensively on graduate workers have an incentive to expand their 
share of output and employment. In the global market, these sectors should increase their exports and 
compete better with imports from similar industries in other countries. On the supply side, with jobs 
hard to find and pay depressed, some graduates will choose to invest in higher-level degrees and delay 
entry into the job market. Their improved skills should help them gain better jobs in the future. 
Geographic mobility of graduates will also help the market equilibrate. Graduates who seek work 
outside the major coastal cities and provinces which have employed most of China's highly educated 
workers in years past will find a better supply-demand balance than in the urban hotspots. More 
graduates working in China's 2nd and 3rd tier cities rather than Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, etc. will 
give the graduates new opportunities and boost economic growth in those areas while reducing the 
surplus of graduates in the largest cities. 
 
The experience of the US and Korea in responding to large influxes of university graduates 
suggests that the most important market adjustment is through graduates using their education  in 
occupations that traditionally relied on less educated workers. This requires that employers offer these 
jobs to graduates and that graduates accept them and that both find ways for the graduates to use their 
skills in raising productivity in those jobs. News stories report that, although graduates earn more than 
non-graduates and presumably get promoted more quickly in non-traditional graduate occupations in 
China as in other countries, many Chinese graduates reject such career paths. Under the headline 
“Chinese Graduates Say No Thanks to Factory Jobs”,48 the New York Times reported on the 
unwillingness of Chinese graduates to accept jobs that required manual labor. But a period of 
joblessness or of temporary work may change those views. Upgrading the education levels of 
occupations and industries across the board will ultimately benefit the overall economy as graduates 
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bring their skills to these areas and it is likely to offer career paths into management and other high-
paying jobs for graduates as they build work experience.  
 
Because disgruntled young graduates can be the cutting edge of social disorder, the Chinese 
government has developed special programs to help them overcome their job problems. In response to 
the reduction in employment opportunities in the Great Recession the government encouraged 
graduates to accept employment outside the major cities, offering them higher wages and other 
benefits. In 2013 the government ordered schools, government agencies and state-owned enterprises to 
hire more graduates to help relieve joblessness. In the troubled Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region, the 
state government set aside posts in government departments and institutions, and in State-owned 
enterprises, for students who finish a new one-year job training program.49 Government programs can 
help improve the matching of graduates and jobs and can encourage universities to develop more job-
oriented educational programs but the bulk of the adjustment to mass higher education rests with 
graduates and employers. 
 
The third big problem facing China's labor market is to move from a dualistic labor market in 
which earnings and social benefits are markedly higher for workers in the formal urban sector than for 
workers with rural hukou and workers in the informal sector to a market that provides similar social 
benefits and opportunity to all workers. Virtually everyone in China appreciates the unfair nature of the 
hukou system that restricts the opportunities and benefits for persons with rural hukou when they reside 
and work in a city. Top leaders and government bodies advocate hukou reforms. Public opinion favors 
reforms.50  And various cities and provinces have experimented with ways to weaken the disadvantage 
of the rural hukou. But cities have been sluggish instituting changes to help migrants when the changes 
reduce the well-being of city residents – for instance by expanding city schools to accept the children 
of migrants or opening urban medical facilities to migrant workers. With limited city budgets and ways 
to raise money and local opposition, it is difficult to make radical changes in the system. The most 
success in reforming the hukou system has come in small and medium sized cities where urban 
amenities are limited. Some large cities have offered point systems through which rural persons can 
gain urban hukou. Some cities privilege persons with rural hukou in the same province.  
 
The issue is not whether China will ultimately scrap a system that disadvantages so many people 
but how quickly it will do so.    
 
Because a disproportionate share of informal sector workers are migrants with rural hukou, 
extending social benefits and rights to persons with rural hukou will benefit many informal sector 
workers. But the problem of the informal sector goes beyond the hukou issue. The problem of low 
wages, high working hours, and lack of pensions and other job-related social insurances for informal 
sector workers is universal among developing countries. Increasing the proportion of workers with 
individual contracts, as the 2007 Contract Labor Law did, was a significant step toward helping  
informal workers employed by large formal enterprises. But it had no direct effect on the self-
employed, or persons in small family or other businesses.  All developing countries are struggling to 
find ways to extend benefits and protections to informal sector workers. Thus far none has come up 
with a “magic bullet” solution.  Benefits given to persons through citizenship regardless of employment 
status – such as national health insurance – offers one solution, but require an effective tax system and 
the willingness of workers and firms in the formal sector to fund benefits for those in the informal 
sector.  
 
CONCLUSION 
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China's transformation from a society dominated by an administered labor system to one with a 
functioning labor market is a remarkable achievement. The before/after contrasts summarized in 
Exhibit 1 and described in the text reflect a unique “natural experiment” of the difference between 
having a labor market determine employment and compensation and determining those outcomes 
without a market. Resolving the three big labor challenges that face the country at this writing – 
creating a modern labor relations system; absorbing huge numbers of college graduates; and extending 
social benefits and equal opportunity to persons with rural hukou and those working in the informal 
sector -- will require strong institutions and policies responsive to the needs and concerns of the 
participants in China's new labor market with Chinese characteristics. 
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Exhibit 1: Supply, Demand, and Labor Institutions Before and After Labor Market Reforms 
 
 Before Labor Market 
Reforms, 1970s – early 1980s 
After Reforms – 
1990s through 2013, 
Policies to regulate 
new labor market 
Firm 
employment 
Determined by the state 
employment quotas; only 
formal employment in state-
owned enterprises 
Shift of 
employment to private 
sector, 
Labor contract law 
policy to move short 
term workers to 
permanent contracts 
Wage 
determination 
Set by national wage grid 
with little variation among 
sectors, employers, or skills. 
Minimal inequality 
Market-determined 
with large increase in 
dispersion of earnings 
City minimum 
wages increase 
rapidly; college to 
migrant earnings gap 
falls with huge 
graduating classes; 
possible Lewis turning 
point  
Provision of 
housing, medical 
insurance, retirement 
pay, other social 
amenities 
Mandated benefits part of 
compensation package for 
firms; ration cards for 
consumer commodities for 
workers with urban hukou 
Eliminate the 
requirement that firms 
provide benefits; 
require contributions to 
portable national 
benefit system 
Portable benefit 
system still work-in-
progress 
    
Migration from 
initial location 
Hukou restrictions; rural 
workers 
Huge “floating 
population” without 
urban amenities 
Contract labor law 
to assure workers of 
legal rights with 
individual contracts 
Worker Choice 
of employer 
State assigns workers to 
firm; 
Almost all urban workers 
employed by state-owned or 
collective enterprises 
Workers choose 
own job; employers 
hire who they want; 
graduates favor safe 
jobs in government but 
biggest growth is 
informal sector work  
Firms favor 
applicants with city 
hukou and from elite 
institution 
Freedom to quit 
and find new 
employer 
Cannot leave job without 
danwei approval; most 
workers stay with single firm 
their entire life 
High worker 
mobility 
Firms complain 
about excessive 
mobility 
Union activity All China Federation of 
Trade Union (ACFTU) 
operates as Leninist 
transmission belt 
ACFTU lobbies for 
worker interests within 
government; some 
branches  
 
 



Exhibit 2:  Market-Driven Widening of Wage and Income Differentials, 1980 to 2011 
 
 
year Urban/R
ural 
Junior 
College or BA 
Degree/High 
School (aged 35) 
Top  paying 
industries/ lowest 
paying industries 
Top paying 
provinces/lowest 
paying provinces 
Junior 
College or BA 
aged 25 /Rural 
Migrant 
1980 2.50  1.42 1.37  
1990 2.20 1.18* 1.61 1.84 1.30* 
2000 2.79 1.24 1.87 2.84 2.30 
2011 3.13 1.43** 3.03 2.35 1.43** 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook; Junior college or BA to High School based on annual income 
from micro China Urban Household Survey data with *1992; ** 2009.  Top and bottom industries and 
top and bottom provinces change over time, so this measures spread of distribution.  For industries, 
unweighted average of top three and bottom three; for provinces unweighted average of top five and 
bottom five.  The data cover fewer industry groups than province groups.  College aged 21 from China 
Urban Household Survey micro-data.  Rural migrant wage per month from Feng Lu 2012.  College 
income of persons aged 25 divided by 12 to be on monthly basis. 
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Exhibit 3:  Measures of Inequality 
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Source: Chi, Wei, Richard B. Freeman, Hongbin Li 2012 
 
Exhibit  4:   Gini Coefficients for Total Income   
 
   
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 1990-2011 based on official statistics; 1980 unofficial estimate 
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